

Hannels

Director of Central Intelligence  
Meeting with Ad Hoc Group from DDO/East Asia Division

31 May 1978

AGENDA

SUBJECT I                      Inability to Protect Secrets                      (10 minutes)

SUBJECT II                      Requirement that for Promotion to  
Supergrade One Must Serve in at  
Least Two Directorates                      (10 minutes)

SUBJECT III                      The Effective Presentation of  
Differing Viewpoints Within the  
Agency                      (10 minutes)

Optional Talking Points and General Discussion                      (30 minutes)

I                      Need to Improve Relationships  
Between Field Stations and  
Counterintelligence Inspection  
Teams

II                      Advancement to Senior Grades in the  
DO Without Assumption of Managerial  
Responsibilities

I. SUBJECT: Inability to Protect Secrets

DISCUSSION: There is a growing perception within the Agency that the Government is virtually powerless to prosecute people who have made unauthorized disclosures of secrets. This perception persists in spite of the successful prosecutions in the Moore, Boyce/Lee, and Truong cases and causes disenchantment for many. We are well aware of the Government's intent to prosecute Frank Snepp, but many believe he, and others like him, will "get away with it." At any rate Snepp is being tried in a civil suit for breach of a CIA contract rather than violation of U.S. criminal law. He will not be placed in jail, only lose royalties, even if prosecuted.

The fact is that a CIA employee could deliver secrets to unauthorized persons and not be prosecuted provided those persons are not agents of a foreign power. We badly need legislation containing criminal sanctions for unauthorized disclosures to punish violators and to restore the confidence of Intelligence Community personnel, agents, potential agents, foreign liaison services and our fellow citizens in the U.S.'s ability to control secrets. This law should cover the entire Intelligence Community including independent contractors, not just the CIA, and provide for prosecuting anyone with authorized access who makes unauthorized disclosures of secrets.

RECOMMENDATION: The Director, acting in his role as head of the Intelligence Community, should discuss the need for the legislation described above with the President and Vice President.

He should urge the President to make such legislation a priority item equal to the most important pieces of Administration-backed legislation. The President, in coordination with agency heads in the Intelligence Community, should enlist bipartisan support for the passage of such legislation. There seems to be support within Congress for this sort of legislation, and the President should galvanize this support and transfer intention into action.

The legislation should call for a 20 year-to-life sentence for unauthorized disclosure of secrets. There should not be any provisions for fines or civil sanctions as this might tend to water down penalties for violation of such a law.

The above suggested legislation would not cover unauthorized disclosure to a foreign power, which is covered under other statutes.

II. SUBJECT: Requirement that for Promotion to Supergrade  
One Must Serve in at Least Two Directorates

DISCUSSION: There are not now sufficient opportunities for rotational assignments among the Directorates. Establishment of a policy which would require that an officer serve in at least two directorates prior to being promoted to a senior grade should be held in abeyance until the mechanism for such rotational assignments exists and has begun to function.

The various directorate managements do not see rotational assignments as beneficial to the objectives of their directorates, nor as career enhancing for their personnel. Most directorate managers think the job/duties of their directorate require specialized, rather than generalized skills, and cannot be adequately filled by people who ordinarily serve outside their directorate. Most managers believe the bonus of widened experience gained by an employee working outside the directorate and career service does not outweigh the loss of their services/expertise to their directorate for that period. There is a concomitant feeling on the part of the employee that being "away" or "on sabbatical leave" from their "real work" for a rotational assignment will adversely affect the employee's career as far as managerial appreciation and promotion panel consideration is concerned.

Also the DO already has its own rotational policy within the Directorate; admittedly, this policy requires reinforcement. The DDO is strongly supporting various calls for good officers to serve rotational assignments as instructors in the Office of Training on

the DO staffs, for instance the CI Staff, and in other area divisions. Further requirements for rotational assignments for good officers outside the DO will place increased burdens on an already constricted operational corps.

RECOMMENDATION: Prior to implementing a policy of promoting to the senior grades only those personnel who have served in at least two directorates:

(a) Senior management levels in each directorate identify and establish specific positions beginning at the GS-12 level which could be filled by qualified people from the disparate disciplines represented in the Agency. The GS-12 level is considered the cut-off point because positions at lower levels would not provide sufficient experience or exposure to enhance the employee's understanding of the other directorate and its relationship to the Agency as a whole.

(b) Vacancy notices for these positions be published and distributed throughout the Agency.

(c) Guidelines for management, promotion panels and employees be published to explain the policy regarding rotational assignments, specify that these rotational assignments are to be considered career enhancing, and state these positions are to be filled by people who have been identified as having the potential to make supergrade.

(d) Phase in this promotion criterion. Begin rotation early, starting now at the GS-12, 13 and 14 levels. Those who now find themselves at the GS-15 level should not have to seek a job outside their directorate in order to be promoted to senior grades.

(e) Institutionalize the program and its mechanism.

(f) The length of the assignment should be limited to one or two years.

III. SUBJECT: The Effective Presentation of Differing Viewpoints  
Within the Agency

DISCUSSION: There have been a number of unauthorized disclosures by former Agency employees who have cited the lack of an effective way to have their personal views on professional issues heard inside the Agency as justification for going public. We realize that there can be no system so perfect that all willingly would be bound by it (and accordingly we support legislation to provide sanctions), but we do not think that realization should keep us from seeking to improve and expand avenues for expression of differing viewpoints on professional matters within the Agency.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(a) Have prepared a list of existing procedures for expressing views within the Agency.

(b) Publicize the list to all Agency employees worldwide.

(c) Publish a summary or representative sampling of the use made of these procedures by employees during the last year-number of instances, categories of subjects or issues, responses by management including actions taken.

Following are a few examples of specific ways to bring employees' views to the surface for serious consideration and response:

(a) Establish a procedure whereby any Agency employee who wishes to present his views on a particular issue may apply to a member of your staff to join a group to meet with you. As it now stands, only the chosen have an opportunity to be a part of such a group and the chosen are not always those who feel most strongly about particular issues.

(b) Establish or adapt an existing mechanism to conduct

polls regularly on issues of concern to employees. Allow employees to propose issues for a poll by submitting a petition bearing a minimum number of signatures, ten, for example, to a member of your staff. (A poll of Agency employees could be used to help determine the need for additional procedures for expressing views.)

(c) Provide secure and sanctioned ways for employees to express views which are not consonant with officially held views without fear of retribution. For example, designate senior officers to make themselves available to listen to and report such views to appropriate officials, and establish a publication or publications to which all employees would be entitled to submit articles. ("Studies in Intelligence" is an example of a formal format for such a publication; a xeroxed newspaper, an informal one.)

1



I. OPTIONAL TALKING POINT

Need to Improve Relationships Between Field Stations and Counterintelligence Inspection Teams

DISCUSSION: Lack of good operational security and poor tradecraft practices jeopardize field operations and raise flap potential. CI teams are deployed to screen operations for CI and operational hazards. The teams, however, are usually viewed as non-fraternal inspectors, even adversaries, in a "them and us" attitude. Field and CI elements should pull together in a "one task" way to upgrade operational security. Field stations are jealous of the prerogatives to target and run operations as they judge they should be run, according to the operational climate and directives. Tradecraft and security in these operations are matters of professionalism and on-site judgment, and stations often resent "second-guessing" by CI teams dispatched from Headquarters: they see these teams as probing inspectors whose aims are revelations that will be detrimental to the station. A natural, if unspoken, antagonism usually pervades a CI visit whether or not a station believes poor operational security exists in the station.

RECOMMENDATION: As another measure of accountability, it would be advisable if DO Divisions could occasionally send their own teams to review their Stations' CI status. This would have the advantage of more continuous CI coverage, and review of tradecraft and operational security practices. Such intra-Division CI visits would then lead to the full CI Staff visit every 3-4 years for complicated, sensitive stations and less often for other stations.

## II. OPTIONAL TALKING POINT

### Advancement to Senior Grades in the DO Without Assumption of Managerial Responsibilities

DISCUSSION: It is our understanding that a system enabling the advancement to senior ranks, of officers who are highly qualified in certain vital skills, without their being forced into supervisory positions has been suggested by other groups, and that such a proposal is being investigated. The need also exists for this program in the DO. The necessity for officers to be supervisors for promotion beyond a certain point results in persons who have distinguished themselves as agent handlers or recruiters--"headhunters" being forced into management positions. This requires them to devote time and effort to managerial responsibilities thus depriving the DO of their operational talents, while placing some individuals in managerial positions who are not suited by temperament, inclination or ability to be managers. DO policy to identify and reward "headhunters" by rapid promotion quickly brings them to the levels where further advancement requires they become managers. As such, instead of using their valuable operational talents they are forced to concentrate on all myriad tasks of a manager in today's DO.

Many of the talents and personality traits of a good operations officer correspond to those of a manager. This is not always so, however, which can lead to jamming square pegs into round holes. In fact, there has been at least one study which found that some of the characteristics that make an outstanding recruiter, for example, are not desirable in a manager.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That the DO also be included in any "two track" program, whereby selected individuals with special qualifications and skills can reach at least the GS-16 level without trying to squeeze themselves into the supervisory mold. Possibly each area division could set aside a given number of GS-13 and GS-14 positions, which would carry no supervisory responsibilities, for proven recruiters and agent handlers. At the DO level a further number of GS-15 and GS-16 positions could be designated.

It is further recommended that the fact this is under consideration, with some preliminary discussion of feasibility, problems and expected benefits, be mentioned in the DIRECTOR'S NOTES.